Specifically, we use role-value maps to express constraints betweenproperty values; we introduce a notion ofPolicySet with associatedparameters that support constraints within a well defined scope; finally, we define a notion ofContext that allows us to refer to property values that were extant in past execution environments. Essentially, these concepts allow us to add constraints to values in policy definitions, to organise policies in coherent and structure blocks, and to refer to the execution history. The paper discusses these concepts and how they are implemented in a binding ofthe KAoS policy language to the myGrid Registry.
Introduction
Complex services in Service-Oriented Architectures such as the Grid typically require to be configured in multiple ways that cannot be anticipated by service designers. Consider the myGrid registry [ 17] , which is capable ofhosting service descriptions and third-party annotations; annotations include semantic descriptions ofservices, trust or accuracy information about them, their usage policies or simply general statistics about their use. Such Grid registries may be deployed in many different ways: e.g., they may be federated or replicated, they may hold annotations to be curated by experts, their access control may be role based. As registries operate semi-autonomously, some additional external constraints may be set by institutions that host them: e.g., about the computing resources they use or about the domains of services being registered.
The variety of service configurations is such that service designers cannot anticipate them all. It is therefore a requirement that such services be provided with the means to specify their configurations, hence giving them the flexibility that is desired at deployment or run time. We argue that policy languages, such as KAoS [22] , Ponder [5] , or Rei [14] can be utilised for configuring complex grid services. In particular, the KAoS language, which has been used for grid security [13, 23] or mobile agents, is an interesting candidate since it is conceived to constrain behaviour of (semi-)autonomous entities through the use of enforcement mechanisms [4] . Another benefit that is relevant to this context is that KAoS is based on the ontology language OWL [1] and therefore OWL-based reasoning can be applied to policies for enforcing them or for detecting conflicts they may entail.
We therefore undertook to use the policy language KAoS to specify configurations of the myGrid registry [17] , which had already been designed to be modularly organised around a set components [18] . Three different usages of KAoS policies have been adopted in our endeavour. Policies are used to (i) to express the behavioural specification of components; (ii) to define components instances and aggregate them in meaningful compositions; and, (iii) to characterise overarching constraints over registries.
Doing so, we have encountered an interesting set of new requirements, which we have addressed by providing extensions to KAoS. These extensions will be discussed in this paper: (i) We made extensive use of role-value maps [20] to add constraints to property values in concept definitions, which would otherwise be not expressible in OWL. (ii) PolicySets, defined as first-class OWL concepts, can be 0-7803-9074-1/05/$20.00 ©2005 IEEE extended with properties and can be referenced by policies belonging to these sets. (iii) Finally, we recognise that a policy language, in particular one that contains obligation policies, has an underlying computational model; we make past execution history explicit through an OWL-concept of context. This paper is organised as follows. We provide further motivation for this work, by detailing a flexible Grid Registry, whose behaviour needs to be specified and constrained at deployment-and run-times (Section 2). We summarise key concepts of the policy language KAoS, which we see as a powerful fit for such an application (Section 3). We then discuss how policies can contribute to the configuration of such a Grid Registry (Section 4). This is followed by an analysis of the requirements that this application introduces on a policy language and the KAoS solutions to address them (Section 5), and an overview of our on-going implementation (Section 6). Finally, we conclude the paper by a discussion and a summary.
Background Motivation: a Flexible Grid Registry
The Grid is a large scale computer system that is capable of coordinating resources that are not subject to centralised control, whilst using standard, open, general-purpose protocols and interfaces, and delivering non-trivial qualities of service [10] . As part of the endeavour to define the Grid, a service-oriented approach has been adopted, by which computational resources, storage resources, networks, programs and databases are all represented by services [11] . In this context, a service is a network-enabled entity capable ofencapsulating diverse implementations behind a common interface. A service-oriented view is powerful since it allows the composition of services to form more sophisticated services.
Service discovery is a difficult task in large-scale open distributed systems such as the Grid and Web, due to the potentially large number of services advertised. In order to filter out the most suitable services for the task at hand, many have advocated the use of semantic descriptions that qualify functional and non-functional characteristics of services in a manner that is amenable to automatic processing [2, 7, 24] .
As part of the myGrid project (www.mygrid.org.uk), a service directory was designed for hosting semantic descriptions ofservices, including their functionality and their semantic inputs and outputs [15] . Semantic descriptions are currently expressed in an OWL ontology [24] . A key characteristics of our approach is that semantic descriptions need not be published by service providers, but can be made available by third party users [15] ; such an approach supports collaborative practices, since users can utilise services because others found them useful or efficient to perform specific tasks. We refer the reader to previous KAoS publications such as [4, 22, 13] for a detailed presentation of the KAoS language and its associated graphical interface KPAT. In this section, we introduce the concepts of KAoS that we use in this paper.
KAoS key entity is the policy that can express authorization (i.e., constraints that permit or forbid some action) or obligation (i.e., constraints that require some action to be performed, or else serve to waive such a requirement) for some type of action performed by one or more actors in some situation. A policy is represented as an ontology subclass of one of the four types of policy classes: positive or negative authorization, and positive or negative obligation. An important property value is the name of a controlled action class, which is used to determine the actual meaning of the policy. Authorization policies use it to specify the action being authorized or forbidden, whereas obligation policies use it to specify the action being obliged or waived. Another property value is the trigger which identifes an action that will trigger the enactment of a policy. Finally, policies are bundled together into named policy sets. Figure 2 illustrates the syntactic notation that we use in this paper and is shown by the KPAT editing interface. It contains the specification of a positive obligation policy p that mandates actors of class X to perform a CommunicationAction, which is a predefined concept in the KAoS ontology. The communication action is to send messages of class Bar to recipients of class Y; such a communication action is referred to as the "controlled action" of the policy, or control for short. In Figure 2 , the trigger of the policy is itself another communication action that must take place to enable the obligation. The trigger requires an obligation's incumbent of class X to be the recipient of a message of class Foo. Informally, the policy requires any X to send a message of class Bar to some Y, whenever it receives a message of class Foo. For instance, such an obligation policy could be instantiated to record incoming messages into a logging service. Concepts Foo and Bar must themselves be defined in an ontology; in our case study, they will denote messages that are used by the registry implementation. In this Section, we analyse how policy languages can help specify the behaviour ofservices, and in particular grid registries. As an illustration, we consider the deployment scenario introduced in Section 2, and specifically, the configuration of Registry 2 for the novice. Figure 3 shows the expert registry and the contents of the novice registry. A notification message, in transit from the expert registry to the novice registry, is meant to indicate that some metadata has been updated in the expert registry. Such a notification message is received by the event handler in the novice registry, which needs to be configured so as to behave according to the scenario described previously. We now introduce different types of policy usage in the context of the registry, namely inside components, registry level and extemal to the registry.
Inside component Upon receiving a MetadataChanged notification message, the EventHandler in the novice registry needs to query the expert registry to obtain the details of the metadata that has changed. If such a metadata pertains to the trust given to a service, than the service detail (and all its metadata) should be retrieved from the expert registry and saved into the novice registry. Such a behaviour can be characterised by five obligation policies: (i) obtain trust metadata from expert registry and check it is greater than threshold; (ii) obtain service detail from expert registry; (iii) save service detail in novice registry using the UDDI publish interface [21] ; (iv) obtain service metadata from expert registry; (v) save service metadata in novice registry using the metadata handler interface [17] . Such behaviour can be specified by obligation policies, which aggregated in a PolicySet, will define a component's behaviour. Registry Level Given a set of components, either programmed directly or specified by policies, a given deployment of the registry will identify how such components need to be connected. Again, such configuration cannot be hard-coded by registry implementers but must be specifiable by deployers. In our case, the policy will identify three component instances (as depicted in Figure 3 ), a set of parameters for example read from a configuration file, and how each of these components will be connected.
Single and Distributed Registries Overarching Constraints Registries may have to conform to the rules set by the institution in which they are deployed. Examples of such rules are: (i) A registry may be authorised to replicate data only. from a trusted remote registry, and it is at the institutional level that such a notion oftrusted registry is specified. (ii) A collection of registries may be authorised to replicate data from each other, but a policy may force them to avoid circularity in data being replicated. (iii) An institution may set constraints on the set of resources a registry can use (such as processor or disk space). (iv) Likewise, an institution may require services in a given registry to be located within some administrative domain (e.g., Southampton services), or to be related to a given application domain (e.g., bioinformatics).
Policy Language Features
We now illustrate how specific application requirements can be expressed with KAoS policy language. [20] , to express such constraints. Figure 4 Figure 5 provides us with an illustration.
Using role value maps and a keyword PolicySet, we can express contraints between concept properties and PolicySet properties. In Figure 5 , we set a constraint to the concept MetadataChanged by requiring the values of its hasTrust property to be greater than the values of the hasThreshold property of the PolicySet the policy belongs to.
hasTrust greaterThan PolicySet --hasThreshold
In Figure 5 , we show how a component behaviour can be specified by a set of policies, including P1 we have just defined. Such a behaviour can be instantiated into two different concrete components c1 and c2, which are each given a specific threshold value (0.5 for cl and 0.8 for c2). Within component cl, policy P1 will be instantiated: its constraint will refer to threshold 0.5. Likewise, the instance of p, in c2 will refer to threshold value 0.8. We note that policy P1 could also be used in a different policy set, which would be instantiated to form other component instances, referring to different threshold values. Figure 5 . PolicySet Properties
Execution Context
An obligation policy such as Pi may initiate an event, whose completion may trigger another obligation policy P2. In other words, the succession of events and triggerings of policies result in the sequenced execution ofobligation policies. In some cases, a given event may trigger several obligation policies, which potentially could be executed in parallel. Hence, the computing model underlying the KAoS policy language naturally supports sequentiality and parallelism. In a policy P2 that is executed afterP1, it is frequent that we have to refer to property values that were extant in the trigger ofP1.
Hence, KAoS provides us with a notion of execution context, through which we can refer to properties that held during the enactment of a previous policy. Since parallel execution may take place, it is understood that multiple execution contexts may coexist, so that each "thread of execution" is entitled to its own context. So, similarly to reserved words to refer to the trigger and the control of a policy, the reserved word Context is used to refer to the execution context of a policy. Its use is illustrated by policy P2 in Figure 6 that mandates the saving of a pair, composed of the result returned by the action in the trigger and the threshold value accessible from the execution context. Policy P1 is the obligation that performs the action, the completion of which triggers P2. We have introduced in policy Pi a new clause with context, which allows us to specify a new context value if Pi is activated. In this example, the new context is formed by extending the Figure 6 . Execution Level Context existing context with a property hasTrust that is equal to a property accessible from the trigger. We note that the keywords PolicySet and Context have different purposes: the former refers to the static structure of policies, whereas the latter refers to execution. From a semantic viewpoint, we allow contexts to be "extended" by adding a new property to an existing context; if the property already existed, the new property ovemdes the previous one. Such a non-mutable semantics of contexts provides a precise behaviour when multiple policies can be triggered in parallel and they share a same execution context 
Overarching Constraint
Finally, we now show an example ofan overarching constraint set by the institution in which a registry is deployed. In Figure 7 , we present a negative authorization policy that prevents a Registry from communicating with remote registries located outside its administrative domain. Such a policy ensures that services advertised in the Registry are 1Specifi cally, the notion ofcontext that we have introduced here corresponds to the notion of environment usually used in denotational semantics of programming language as opposed to the notion of store. not propagated to other institutions, and that the Registry's content is not directly changed by updates coming from other domains. The myGrid registry adopts a message passing metaphor, according to which a set of components only communicate by message passing [18] ; each component is implemented as a handler of messages of a given type. From an implementation viewpoint, messages are specified in the registry's WSDL interface and converted into Java classes (using the Axis wsdl2java converter). In order to structure the code, messages implement the visitor pattern; handlers are expressed as visitors for sets of messages. Such a code design insures proper compile-time type checking and promotes compositionality of components.
In order to bind the KAoS run time system to the myGrid registry, we have defined new message visitors that are capable of converting messages and their contents into communication actions understood by KAOS. KAoS offers an API that allows the construction of "Action Instance Descriptions" as OWL concepts with their associated properties. A querying interface allows us to identify the obligations that are triggered by a given action; to this end, KAoS uses OWL-based reasoning to find the obligations, whose triggers match the current action, and obtain the resulting controls, instantiated for the given trigger. Such actions now need to be converted back to Java messages that can be handled by the myGrid registry; they are then dispatched to the appropriate handlers, as specified by the triggered obligation. As far as authorization policies are concerned, they can be enforced using a similar technique to [13] , in which an access control modules decides, using OWL-based reasoning, whether a request can be appropriately delegated to a component, or whether it should be rejected.
Discussion and Related Work
Policy languages have been the focus of much attention lately in the Grid and Web Services communities. Policies have usefully been applied in the context of autonomous services and agents that cannot always be trusted to regulate their own behaviour appropriately, because poorly designed, buggy or malicious [4] . Specifically, policy languages, such as KAoS [4] or Ponder [6] , allow system designers to externally adjust the bound of autonomous behaviour, in order to ensure safety and effectiveness of their system: policy languages and associated mechanisms to enforce them allow the dynamic regulation ofthe system components behaviour without changing their code, nor requiring the cooperation of the components being governed. Policy languages have also been adopted by the Web Services community, in particular, in the context of security: for instance, WS-Policy is a framework for indicating a service's requirements and policies [3] .
WS-Policy introduces a simple grammar for expressing the capabilities, requirements, and general characteristics of Web Services and their clients. Policy expressions allow for domain-specific declarative and conditional assertions. WS-Policy defines a policy to be a collection of one or more policy assertions. WS-Policy, in comparison to KAoS, takes a different view on policy semantics since it defines policy from the perspective of capabilities or behaviour required to access particular service. Thus, the WS-Policy policies, in essence, provide lists of possible values for properties defining capabilities. As previously described, KAoS policy semantics is concentrated around authorizations and obligations, which can also be used to obtain lists of allowed values for a given service request. However, KAoS declarative definitions based on ontology allow for greater flexible computing of these lists based on the current context. In general, the fact that KAoS is using ontology both as a base of its policy vocabulary and as its policy constructs allows us to build much more complex policy definitions then WS-Policy and more importantly allows for reasoning of policy applicability and relations. Recent work by Parsia et al. [ 19] provides mappings of WS-Policy into OWL that allows them to reason about policy containment, i.e., whether the requirements for supporting one policy are a subset of the requirements for another. WS-SecurityPolicy defines extensions for security properties for Web Services [8] ; SAML [12] , the Security Assertion Markup Language, is a framework for exchanging authentication and authorization information.
Among the plethora of policy languages, KAoS adopts the original approach of expressing policy specifications in the ontology language OWL [1], which gives it a number of significant advantages. First, most policy specifications need to refer to domain specific concepts, which are typically formalised in an ontology; therefore, by expressing both policies and concepts in OWL, policy specifications are able to refer to concepts easily. Second, reasoning over policy specifications can decide if a set of policies subsumes another, or if a set of policies results in conflicts; thus, we naturally benefit from OWL'S underlying reasoning mechanism by expressing polices in OWL. Third, the policy language is not constructed in an ad-hoc manner for specific application domains, but it draws its vocabulary from a well-understood, clearly specified set of OWL terms. This paper introduces a new kind of use of the KAoS language since it applies KAoS to the behavioural specification of Grid registries. Miles et al. [16] is a first attempt of using policies for specifying the behaviour of Grid registries. Their approach differs from ours in two different ways. First, it adopts an ad-hoc policy language to describe the configuration of a system; such a language does not offer the systematism of OWL-based KAoS, nor its reasoning capababilities; on the other hand, since it was purposely designed for the task, it is more concise. Second, in order to enforce management policy in a registry, Miles et al. create an agent that processes the goals of the policy and the operations performed on the registry using the belief-desireintention model and its specific instantiations as the procedural reasoning system (PRS) and the distributed multiagent reasoning system (dMARS) [9] . As far as enforcement (i.e., execution) is concerned, both approaches have strong theoretical underpinning, respectively OWL-based reasoning and belief-desire-intention model. The KAoS approach offers the additional advantage that reasoning can be applied statically over policies, to detect conflicts or to perform subsumption reasoning, a facility that is not available in Miles' approach. From a performance viewpoint, reasoning is also used to decide if a policy applies to an incoming message; in the simplest case, pattern matching suffices to match an incoming message against applicable policies; in the most complex case, ontological reasoning is required which trigger is semmantically satisfied; our focus is on optimising such a process, by maximising the amount ofoffline reasoning, so as to reduce the amount ofreasoning requied at run time.
Conclusion
By studying the configuration ofdistributed grid services using the policy language KAoS, we have elicited requirements that are typical of complex systems. We have introduced extensions to KAoS that address these requirements. The core extension is the notion of role-value maps that allows us to express constraints over OWL property values. This feature is extensively used in our other extensions for defining policies whose control refers to trigger value, for structuring policies into policy sets that are parameterised by run-time values, and for referring to past execution history. These extensions make KAoS a very powerful policybased configuration language, while still providing benefits such as reasoning for detecting policy conflicts and enforcing polices.
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